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Abstract 
South Africa’s small pelagics fishery is moving towards a management strategy using an 
ecosystem approach to fisheries (EAF), with rights-based management (RBM) as the 
key rights allocation system. While EAF strives to balance between, among others, 
ecological and social-economic objectives, RBM is driving the sector towards economic 
efficiency. Within EAF itself, there are still underlying mismatches between the two 
top objectives, ‘human wellbeing’ and ‘ecological wellbeing’, in effect requiring a better 
balance between these objectives than there is currently. For example, fishers do not 
believe they should be competing with marine mammals and birds for allocation of the 
resource, yet this is one of the primary trade-offs that have to be made when setting the 
annual total allowable catches (TACs) under EAF. A balance between the two 
objectives could be achieved through acceptable trade-offs between them among all 
stakeholders within inclusive governance. Implementation of RBM has had both positive 
and negative effects on the objectives for EAF. Of concern are the negative effects of RBM 
on human wellbeing. For example, fishers feel that RBM has weakened their bargaining 
position, thereby reducing their benefits. In addition, RBM has resulted in job losses and 
insecurity of employment within the fisheries sector. The most affected have been the 
most vulnerable — the low level workers — who ought to be the key beneficiaries of 
RBM. Thus prioritising and protecting vulnerable groups and fishing communities need 
careful consideration when creating RBM, even in the context of EAF. Rights-based 
management has also had negative effects on ecological wellbeing through practices such 
as increased dumping and ‘high grading’ as part of industry’s drive for increased 
efficiency under RBM. Whereas scientists believe that variability is largely due to 
environmental conditions, fishers strongly feel that dumping, high grading and high 
fishing pressure are the main factors. One of the positive aspects of RBM has been 
improved understanding among rights-holders and fishers of the need to consider other 
organisms in the TAC and to protect these through establishment of marine protected 
areas, island perimeter closures and limiting bycatch, thereby impacting positively on 
ecological wellbeing. 
 
Introduction: 
South Africa’s fisheries policy is founded upon the constitutional principle that all the 
country’s marine resources are a national asset and the heritage of its citizens that 
should be managed and developed for the benefit of its present and future 
generations (Marine Living Resources Act No. 18 of 1998, RSA 1998a; White Paper: 
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marine fisheries policy, DEAT 1997). Although the fisheries sector contributes <1% 
(approximately 0.6% in 2008)1 to South Africa’s gross domestic product, the policy 
objectives recognise the need for the sector to improve its overall contribution to the 
country’s long-term vision of a democratic South Africa, inter alia: a competitive, 
fast-growing economy that creates sufficient jobs for all work-seekers; redistribution of 
income and opportunities in favour of the poor; a society in which sound health, 
education and other services are available to all; and an environment in which homes 
are secure and places of work are productive (Department of Finance 1996). 
Following the protracted fisheries policy revision process (Hersoug 2002, Isaacs and 
Hara 2008, Hara and Raakjær 2009) that culminated in the enactment of the Marine 
Living Resources Act (RSA 1998a), the rights allocation policy evolved from annually 
renewable rights to medium-term rights for the period 2002–2005 and then to long-
term rights (from 2006 onwards). 
 
From 2006, the government of South Africa issued 15-year (2006–2020) long-term 
fishing rights for most of the commercial species including small pelagic fish. Long-term 
rights are a form of a rights-based management (RBM) approach. The overarching 
objectives that had been set by government for allocating long-term rights were: to 
maintain and improve the transformation of the fishing industry; to create an 
environment for attracting investment in infrastructure; job creation; encouragement of 
value-adding; reduction of bycatch; and generally to promote the economic viability and 
environmental sustainability of commercial fisheries (DEAT 2005a). 
 
South Africa committed itself to introducing an ecosystems approach to fisheries 
(EAF) by 2010 (DEAT 2005a). 
 
This followed the 2001 Reykjavik Declaration (FAO 2003) and the Johannesburg 2002 
World Summit on Sustainable Development (UNCSD 2002), which urged countries 
to develop and implement national plans for maintaining or restoring fish stocks to 
maximum sustainable yield levels. 
 
This study investigates the efficacy of RBM within the EAF for achieving both socio-
economic and bio-ecological objectives, which the commercial fisheries sectors are being 
increasingly asked to do. Questions that arise include: how is this contributing towards 
achieving government’s policy objectives, and what is the impact on the resource, the 
rights-holders, the workers (especially vessel workers and factory workers), and, in 
effect, the fishing communities? The South African small pelagics sector is used here as 
the study case. 
 
Small pelagics 
South Africa’s fishing rights for small pelagics are based on the exploitation of sardine 
Sardinops sagax and anchovy Engraulus encrasicolus, with associated bycatch for 
round herring Etrumeus whiteheadii and Cape horse mackerel Trachurus capensis. 
This sector is the biggest in terms of landed volume of fish and second only to hake 
Merluccius spp. in terms of value of landed catch. Sardine are mostly canned whereas 
anchovy are reduced to fishmeal, fish oil and fish paste. The sector is managed using 
operational management procedures (OMPs) (Fairweather et al. 2006, Butterworth 
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2007, 2008, de Moor et al. 2011) that set annual total allowable catch (TAC) for anchovy 
and sardine, and associated bycatch for the other species. For the long-term rights, 109 
entities have been awarded 15-year (2006–2020) rights (George Warman Publications 
2007). In addition, the South African management system limits the number of 
vessels that can be deployed in the sector to about 100 (DEAT 2005b). 
 
The west coast of South Africa has historically been the area in which small pelagics 
are available to fishers. Most of the sector’s infrastructure — the fishing fleet, and 
major canning and fishmeal factories — is based on the West Coast, at Saldanha Bay, 
St Helena Bay and Velddrif. Coastal communities have settled in and around this area, 
largely based on derivation of employment from the fishing industry (van Sittert 2002, 
Isaacs 2003). In addition, a small fleet operates from Hout Bay in Cape Town and 
another from Gans Bay on the south coast of the Western Cape province. Nelson 
Mandela Bay is the base for the fleet exploiting the resource in the Eastern Cape 
province. Nevertheless, the mainstay of the small pelagic sector remains on the West 
Coast. 
 
Study approach 
This study was conducted on the West Coast in 2010 and 2011. The study was 
undertaken using semi-structured interviews with key informants and focus groups. In 
all, 23 individual interviews and four focus-group discussions (with the West Coast 
Pelagic Fishers’ Association, a group of skippers and two crew member groups) were 
undertaken. The following categories of stakeholders were interviewed: fishing vessel 
skippers and crew members, rights-holders (both individual and representatives of 
companies) and employees of the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF): branch Fisheries Management. Where authentication of the authoritativeness 
of specific information is required, the system of ‘personal communication’ (pers. 
comm.) referencing has been used. A questionnaire was used as a guide for the 
interviews. The key list of questions was arranged under the following categories: 
changes in status of the fishery; resource assessment and monitoring practices; social 
and economic benefits from the fishery; structural organisation of fishers; 
employment opportunities; wider community benefits; and access and inclusion in 
decision-making, stewardship and governance arrangements. 
 
Rights-based fisheries management 
One of the key questions in fisheries management is whether creation of property rights 
could close open-access to fishing commons and thereby improve both bio-ecological 
and socio-economic management outcomes. The idea of property rights in fisheries is 
based on the idea of extending exclusive ‘use rights’ to fishers (OECD 1997, Christy 
2000, Edwards 2000, Eythόrsson 2000, Hatcher and Read 2001, Arnason 2005). 
Rights in a fishery define a claim to a benefit stream that is protected by law, and 
what particular actions a rights-holder is legally authorised to undertake in extracting 
the benefits (Bromley 1989). Property rights are supposed to provide for perpetuity, 
security, exclusivity and transferability (Hallowell 1943, Alchian and Demsetz 1973, 
Schlager and Ostrom 1992, World Bank 2004, Ostrom 2009) of a rights-holder’s 
share in a fishery. This would presumably increase the value of the right and 
influence the behaviour of rights-holders, especially with regard to positive 
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husbandry, incentives to invest in the industry and compliance with regulations, 
thereby improving the long-term biological, social and economic sustainability of 
the resource and the benefits (OECD 1997, Edwards 2000, Shotton 2000, Arnason 
2005). Property rights are also intended to increase economic and social benefits for 
all direct industry participants (rights-holders and their employees), and society at 
large, through industry rationalisation and maximisation of economic efficiency 
(Christy 2000, Copes and Pálsson 2000, Edwards 2000, Eythόrsson 2000, Arnason 
2001, 2005). 
 
For administrators and fishers, an initial and critical issue in RBM is the basis for 
eligibility for allocation of a right. The most common approach is ‘catch history’ (Copes 
and Pálsson 2000, Edwards 2000, Arnason 2005, DEAT 2005a). However, there are 
usually reasons to recognise that others without a fishing history should also be eligible 
for a right in a fishery. In South Africa’s context, this is particularly pertinent due to 
the history of disenfranchisation of blacks from fishing rights under apartheid (Hersoug 
2002, van Sittert 2002, DEAT 2005a, Raakjær Nielsen and Hara 2006, Isaacs et al. 
2007). In addition, allocations should be considered for skippers, processing factory 
workers and fishing communities. The question of equity therefore generally arises 
with regard to the allocation of exclusive use rights as property rights define who can 
and cannot participate in the fishery, especially given that decisions about allocation 
of use rights may be very difficult to reverse once rights have been allocated (Eythόrsson 
2000). 
 
Two basic approaches are used to create property rights under RBM — individual 
transferable quotas (ITQs) and licensing limits (OECD 1997, Hatcher 2005). Under 
the former approach, the annual allowable catch is divided into shares, which are 
distributed among the eligible rights-holders. The limited licensing system generally tries 
to limit access to a fishery by limiting the number of vessels. South Africa uses a 
combination of both approaches for most commercial species including small 
pelagics; long-term rights-holders have a fixed proportion of the annual TAC for the 
duration of those rights and there is a maximum of 100 vessels allowed in the sector. 
 
Ecosystems approach to fisheries 
Fisheries management has generally been based on single-species management through 
limitation of the volume of fish of a specific species that can be harvested to ensure 
sustainable utilisation. It is now recognised that fishing can have substantial impacts on 
the broader marine environment — through alteration of the benthic habitat, foodwebs 
and the biodiversity of marine communities — in addition to the target species (Pitcher 
and Lam 2010). 
 
Fishing is only one use of the marine ecosystem and society can benefit from many 
other uses. These include other commercial (e.g. tourism, mineral and  oil  extraction, 
shipping and energy generation), cultural, social and non-consumptive uses, which are 
being recognised increasingly through ‘marine spatial planning’ initiatives in Europe 
(Ounanian et al. 2012).  Consideration  must  therefore be taken of other competing 
uses, social and economic values to society and the requirements of other organisms in 
the ecosystem. Fisheries policy decisions should account for all these aspects. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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Ecosystems approach to fisheries is recognised as the integrative governance  
framework that combines conventional fisheries management and ecosystem 
management (FAO 2003). Ward et al. (2002) defined EAF as ‘an extension of 
conventional fisheries management recognizing more explicitly the interdependence 
between human well-being and ecosystem health and the need to maintain ecosystems’ 
productivity for present and future generations’ (quoted in FAO 2003, p 6). 
 
South Africa introduced an EAF in 2002 (Shannon et al. 2004, DEAT 2005a, 2005b, 
Petersen et al. 2010). The policy for the allocation and management of small pelagics 
(DEAT 2005b, p 14) states that ‘the fishery shall be managed in accordance with the 
EAF approach’. The policy defines an EAF as ‘a holistic and integrated policy which 
recognises that fishing and various land-based activities impact on the broader 
marine environment’ (DEAT 2005b, p 14). The policy would include, among others, 
protection of ecosystems, elimination of destructive fishing practices, establishment of 
marine protected areas (MPAs) and protection of nursery grounds during fish 
spawning periods (DEAT 2005a). 
 
Following a series of multi-stakeholder workshops to conduct ecological risk 
assessments for all the major commercial species, hierarchal trees of the main 
components of the EAF in South Africa were developed (Paterson and Petersen 2010, 
Petersen et al. 2010). The generic tree, adapted from FAO (2003), has three main 
components, namely ecological wellbeing, human wellbeing and ability to achieve 
(Paterson et al. 2010, Petersen et al. 2010). Currently, the ecological risk assessment 
approach remains the only formal implementation mechanism for EAF in South Africa 
(Paterson and Petersen 2010). 
 
Conceptual framework for study 
This study uses seven key performance indicators of RBM in South Africa’s small 
pelagics industry: transformation, investment in infrastructure, job creation, reduction 
of bycatch, economic viability, environmental sustainability and management stability 
(DEAT 2005a, DAFF 2012). The general EAF framework adapted by Petersen et al. 
(2010) for South Africa (ecological wellbeing, human wellbeing, and ability to achieve) 
was used to analyse the efficacy of RBM within this ecosystems approach. 
 
Rights-based fishing in an ecosystem approach setting 
This section presents the findings from interviews and from secondary sources. 
 
The bundling of rights by processing factories  
Historically, quotas were issued to factories while catching rights  were  awarded  to  
vessel  owners,  who  in  most instances  skippered  their  own  vessels.  The  factories 
therefore had to contract out the catching of their quota to vessel owners. Up to 80% of 
the catching was done on this basis (F Tolken and H Smit, West Coast Pelagic Fishers’ 
Association, pers. comm.). Factories therefore sought the most skilled skippers and 
crew to catch the factory quota. One of the conditions for awarding medium- and long-
term rights had been the need for rights-holders to demonstrate commitment to the 
industry through investment. Thus, increasingly, factories bought their own vessels. 
Currently, most processing companies have a quota, vessels for harvesting their 
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quota and a processing factory. Therefore, factories mainly use their own vessels to 
harvest their quota. Although independent vessel owners can obtain their own 
quotas, these might be too small to make the vessel viable without catching 
contracts. The contracts with factories and/or rights-holders without vessels are thus 
still vital for the economic viability of independent vessel ownership. It was due to 
increased lack of viable catching contracts with factories that most independent 
vessel owners sold their vessels and moved out of the industry in the 1990s and 2000s. 
Those who remained in the industry without vessels work for the factories as 
independent skippers (F Tolken and H Smit pers. comm.). Unlike the arrangement 
on the West Coast, the old agreement still exists on the South Coast between the 
Gans Bay Marine processing company (which has a quota but no vessels) and 
independent vessel owners. The quota is caught by independent vessel owners who are 
paid a catching fee that is agreed upon between the factory and the vessel owners (A 
Coetzee, Gans Bay Marine, pers. comm.). 
 
Structure of employment and employee benefits 
The skipper recruits his own crew, even when he is contracted by a factory to fish 
using a factory vessel. The factory has no contractual obligations to the crew members 
and is thus shielded from any labour issues or disputes with them2. Whereas the 
contracts with vessel owners and skippers were for one year in the past, these are 
increasingly structured as seasonal contracts in line with the fishing season and fish 
availability (H Smit pers. comm.). 
 
In terms of remuneration, skippers and crew members are paid a proportion of the 
value of the catch, based on the fishmeal price or the raw fish price for sardine, which 
varies between 4.8% and 5.1% (L Strydom, West Coast Pelagic Fishers’ Association, 
pers. comm.). In the past, the Fishmeal Producer Association determined and published 
the average fishmeal price, which skippers and crew members could use to determine 
what constituted their share of the benefits from the delivered catch. Unfortunately, the 
association does not publish this price anymore, following the bread-price fixing3 case 
that the South African Competition Commission had against producers, some of which 
are part of the group of companies with shares in the fishmeal industry. The association 
thus stopped publishing the average price for fishmeal to guard against falling foul of 
anti-competitive regulations with the Competition Commission. As a result, there is no 
longer a third-party mechanism to arbitrate the price between factories and the 
skippers/crew members. The price is negotiated between the individual factories and the 
skippers/ crew members. The fishers pointed out that because they worked for factories 
or delivered their catch to the individual factories, they are ‘price takers’. 
 
Once the skippers and crew members receive their proportion of the value of the catch 
based on the fishmeal or raw fish price, this is shared among them, according to agreed 
proportions. The proportions among the skippers and crew members on most vessels 
are as follows: skipper (24.22%), mate (11.11%), driver (11.11%), crew members (53.56%). 
 
In addition to this basic pay, the skippers and crew members receive incentive bonuses 
on a sliding scale based on quality of fish. For sardine, the bonuses are based on a 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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premium-quality sliding scale based on the number of cartons produced per tonne of fish 
(L Strydom pers. comm.). 
 
Marine protected areas, island perimeter closures and consideration of 
birds and marine mammals in the TAC 
An important aspect of the EAF policy and related legislation is the requirement for 
consideration of organisms affected directly or indirectly within the marine 
environment. The Sixteen Mile Beach MPA was established in this context (Wood 
2007). In addition, the MPA overlaps with the 10.8 nautical mile radius around 
Dassen Island within which purse-seine fishing had been prohibited for three years 
to accommodate a feasibility study aimed at the conservation of African penguins 
Spheniscus demersus (DEAT 2008). The introduction of island perimeter closures and 
the MPA is aimed at leaving space for marine birds and mammals to thrive and also 
for fish to breed without interference. In addition, consideration has to be given to 
how much of the small pelagics resource should be left for seals, seabirds, penguins and 
other living organisms when determining the TAC (e.g. Cury et al. 2011). 
 
The fishers maintain that the strict enforcement of the Sixteen Mile Beach MPA no-
take zone has affected their catches, because the best catches used to be taken in this 
area. The skippers estimated that this has resulted in an annual loss of between 30 
000 and 50 000 t of good-quality sardine. 
 
Variability, competition with marine mammals and high grading 
The fishers interviewed had the historical knowledge and experience that variability in 
abundance is characteristic of the pelagic resource, a notion that has been supported by 
scientific research (Fairweather et al. 2006, Hutchings et al. 2009, van der Lingen et 
al. 2011). In addition, there is strong evidence to show that there was a shift in the 
relative availability of fish from the West Coast to the South Coast during some years 
of the first decade of the millennium (Fairweather et al. 2006). The resource, however, 
appears to have shifted back recently, resulting in a larger proportion of its standing 
stock being caught in its traditional fishing grounds on the West Coast (van der 
Lingen et al. 2011). For most fishers, the threats to sustainability of the resource are 
twofold; the increasing seal population — because, in their opinion, seals take a 
considerable proportion of the resource4 — and dumping, which fishers consider is 
common practice. The fishers considered that dumping of fish (high grading) was 
partly influenced by the fact that factories require a minimum size of sardine that is 
suitable for canning (about 14 cm). Also, factories have a maximum limit of fish volume 
that they can take delivery of, based on a plant’s processing capacity. The skippers and 
their crews therefore have to ensure that they catch the right size and volume of fish for 
delivery. 
 
Number of vessels 
The number of operational fishing vessels in the sector has declined by nearly one-
third in the past decade, mainly as a result of most independent vessel owners 
leaving the industry. Also, factories have been buying new and bigger boats 
following the assurance of being granted medium- and long-term rights. Further, 
owners have been replacing their old wooden vessels, which normally did not have 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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refrigeration facilities, with larger, more fuel-efficient steel or fibre glass vessels with 
refrigeration systems. The maximum number of vessels allowed in the sector is about 
100 (DEAT 2005b). The number of vessels operating at any given time is largely 
influenced by the annual quota size; for example, only 71 vessels were declared 
operational for the 2011 season on the permits issued (J de Goede, DAFF, pers. comm.). 
According to the interviewees, the increased use of more efficient, mechanised vessels 
and fewer vessels has resulted in loss of jobs for skippers and crew members. 
 
Stewardship (co-management) of the resource and sector  
In the small pelagics sector, each fishing zone has a sea management committee 
(SMC), comprising local stakeholders (skippers, factory managers and DAFF fisheries 
monitoring control and surveillance inspectors). The SMC has powers to initiate 
discussion and propose temporary closure of an area if the size of the fish being 
caught is below the 14 cm minimum size required for canning. The committee also 
enforces such closures among its members. In this sense, the SMC is a rights holder-based 
management organisation that takes action bottom-up in liaison with the state 
authorities. The department (DAFF: branch Fisheries Management) also has a system 
whereby observers are placed on a number of randomly selected vessels to collect 
(mainly) biological data. 
 
At the national level, the Small Pelagics Scientific Working Group (SWG) and the 
Resource Management Working Group (RMWG) are the formal governance structures 
for the sector where government scientists, representatives of stakeholder groups and 
non-governmental organisations discuss scientific and management issues and make 
recommendations to the Deputy Director General DAFF for final decision 
(Nyikahodzoi et al. 2010). Some of the key recommendations that are made by the 
SWG concern the TAC for the coming year, a revision of the TAC after a mid-year 
survey and other scientific issues. The RMWG is the body where distribution of 
rights and operational management issues are discussed. Not all rights-holders and 
fishers (skippers and crew members) belong to stakeholder associations and 
consequently they do not have representation on the working groups5. 
 
Efficacy of RBM within an EAF 
The assumption under an EAF is that improved species and environmental sustainability 
(ecological wellbeing) through stable and assured rights should result in increased 
social and economic benefits (human wellbeing). Hence RBM should lead to an 
increased incentive on the part of fishers to ensure the improved productivity and 
sustainability of the resource and ecosystem that forms the bedrock of revenue 
generation. Inclusive stewardship by all concerned stakeholders should increase the 
system’s general ‘ability to achieve’. Rights-based management should thus enhance the 
potency of EAF and result in increased wellbeing of the marine resource system in 
question and the dependent human society. The question is whether this is indeed the 
case when viewed from the perspective of South Africa’s small pelagics sector. 
 
Bargaining position of vessel workers 
Given that most of the sardine caught are canned and the anchovy are reduced into 
fishmeal and fish oil, the processing right (through ownership of canning and fishmeal 
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factories) is probably the key and controlling deterministic right in the sector. The 
bundling of rights by processing factories has strengthened their negotiating position 
and at the same time weakened that of skippers and the crew, independent vessel 
owners and independent quota-holders. The increased ownership of vessels and/or the 
upgrading of existing vessels by factories have further strengthened their negotiating 
and bargaining position. In particular, the processing right gives the factories 
considerable leverage in terms of the price they would be willing to pay for the 
delivered catch. Hence the skippers and crew members, independent vessel owners 
and independent quota-holders from the West Coast felt that the new rights-holding 
system had disadvantaged them greatly and that overall the current structure and 
system of rights allocation under RBM had reduced their benefits, thereby negatively 
affecting the human wellbeing objective under EAF. 
 
Security of employment 
Rights-based management has not changed the historical organisation of the catching 
sector, whereby the skipper sources, selects and employs his own crew. Even in situations 
in which a skipper is contracted to fish for a factory using a factory vessel, this 
arrangement remains unchanged. Thus the vessel owner, unless the skipper is the 
vessel owner, has no employer responsibilities towards crew members. To minimise 
potential labour relations problems, the skipper will not usually employ crew members 
belonging to labour unions. These ‘casual labour’ employment practices are contrary 
to the Labour Relations Act (Act No. 66 of 1995; RSA 1995) and the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act (Act No. 11 of 2002; RSA 2002), which stipulate that anyone who has 
been employed for more than three months continuously qualifies as a permanent 
employee (Hara 2009). The insecurity of employment for crew members and the benefit 
sharing schemes based on amount and quality of catch are likely to increase the 
occurrence of high grading at sea in order to maximise earnings. RBM management has 
exacerbated the insecurity of employment among skippers and crew members and 
has also increased the likelihood of negative fishing practices among crew to the 
detriment of the resource, thus having negative effects on both EAF objectives of 
human wellbeing and ecological wellbeing. 
 
Community benefits 
For the rest of the local fishing communities on the West Coast the benefits from the 
sector are indirect, received as dependants of those employed in the sector (on the vessels 
and/or in the factories) or from multiplier effects and/or value chains such as wages 
spent by small pelagics industry employees on consumer goods and services. The 
purchase of bigger and more highly mechanised boats by the factories has resulted in 
fewer vessels and less crew members. The endeavour for increased efficiency also extends 
to factories, which in the past ran three shifts of eight hours each but now, in most 
cases, run only one shift of 12 hours per day, a 50% reduction in total working hours6. 
The reduction in the number of people employed and the decrease in factory 
working hours means a decline in the level of benefits derived from the sector by 
workers (and therefore their dependants) and in the spread of benefits to the rest of 
the immediate community. In essence, although the sector might have become more 
operationally efficient and more profitable, the impact on low-level workers has been 
negative, in contradiction of the EAF objective of human wellbeing. 
https://repository.uwc.ac.za/
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Fishing pressure and variability 
The introduction of RBM has not necessarily eradicated the competitive aspect within the 
fishing sector, i.e. catching the most and the best fish. This is especially pertinent in the 
small pelagics fishery where resource abundance is characteristically variable. Thus, the 
new, more efficient purse-seiners that the rights-holders have been investing in still 
present a challenge for sustainable fishing. The practice of under-reporting is still 
common. In addition, it is not clear whether the shift in geographic availability of 
the small pelagics from the West Coast to the South Coast over the past decade could 
be attributed to environmental changes or to fishing pressure on the West Coast (van 
der Lingen et al. 2011). Skippers strongly believe, however, that fishing pressure is a key 
factor in both variability and geographic shift and thus they support the notion that a 
closed season for a few months should be re-introduced. Fishers feel aggrieved that 
they now have to compete with seals, penguins and seabirds for quotas and for some 
of the prime fishing areas (through establishment of MPAs and island perimeter 
closures) as part of EAF. 
 
High grading 
Management of rights-holders has not solved the problem of dumping or high grading 
in the sector. Whereas dumping is one of the issues that EAF seeks to discourage, this 
practice is economically efficient as rights-holders want to land the size and quality 
of fish that will maximise their earnings (high grading). Bycatch limits, temporary 
area closures, island perimeter closures and MPAs, all supported by EAF, force skippers 
to fish farther from their fishing bases and factories, thereby increasing fishing 
operational costs, a situation that is not in line with the objectives of RBM. 
 
Balancing needs of fishers and other organisms 
Within EAF, other marine organisms have been given greater recognition and 
protection — in terms of their food and other environmental requirements — than 
under previous, largely single-species approaches to fisheries management. Rights-
holders have had to understand and accept this need for a balanced approach that 
takes cognisance of other organisms that interact with small pelagics when TACs are 
set and specific geographic areas are closed to fishing. Key to this acceptance has 
been consultative decision-making within the formal structures, namely SMCs, the 
SWG and the RMWG. Thus, EAF has increased awareness of competition for fish 
between fishers and marine organisms. 
 
Cooperative governance 
Confidence in a RBM management approach is supposed to be enhanced if rights-
holders are directly involved in management decision-making. The question arises as 
to whether RBM has improved stewardship of the resource and the sector? The local 
and national co-governance structures ensure that the majority of stakeholders have 
structured and regular contact with each other. Although the views and inputs of rights-
holders and fishers are supposed to be advisory, they carry weight in the sense that 
these are based on long-term and practical knowledge of the fishery and up-to-date 
experience of what is happening at the catching and operational level (Fairweather et al. 
2006). The general view among most rights-holders and fishers is that government is 
generally very responsive to their views and interests, although this has not been the 
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case on occasions. For example, the proposal by skippers and crew members for the re-
introduction of a November–December annual closed season7, as well as the 
complaint by the fishers regarding the reduced catches of good sardine from the 
West Coast area as a result of the Sixteen Mile Beach MPA being declared no-take, did 
not yield positive results. Despite these examples, the general feeling among the fishers 
was that the functions of the SMCs, the SWG and the RMWG ensure that the fishery 
is managed in a consultative and cooperative manner. The key concern under the 
current system is that socio-economic factors are not adequately included in the OMP, 
since this remains a tool that mainly uses biological and ecological inputs 
(Fairweather et al. 2006). In a fully operational EAF, all components of the 
ecosystem, including human (social and economic) factors, should be taken into account. 
 
Summary and conclusions 
The following questions arise: has the RBM system resulted in increased ecological 
wellbeing for the resource and marine environment; has it resulted in improved 
human wellbeing for the sector workers and immediate community; and has it resulted 
in an enhanced ability to achieve for the sector? A number of conclusions can be drawn 
from this study regarding effects of implementing RBM within an EAF: 
 
1. Fishers feel that the current structure and system of rights allocation under RBM 
has weakened their bargaining power when dealing with factories, resulting in 
reduction in their benefits. In addition, the new rights system has exacerbated 
their insecurity of employment. In this context, the structure of rights, and the 
benefits thereof under RBM, 
1. negatively affect EAF’s human wellbeing objective. 
 
2. The reduction in the number of jobs, both on vessels 
3. and in factories, as a part of the drive for increased efficiency under RBM, has 
meant a decline in the overall level of benefits derived from the sector for workers, 
their dependants and the coastal communities that largely thrive and depend 
on the fishing industry. On the whole, whereas the sector might have become 
more operationally efficient and improved its profitability, the impact on 
human wellbeing for low-level workers and their communities has been 
negative. 
4. Dumping and high grading are practices that are reported still to be prevalent in 
the sector and stakeholders felt that RBM has not necessarily solved this 
problem. The benefit-sharing schemes based on quality of catch encourage 
these tendencies among skippers and their crew as a way of maximising their 
earnings. In addition, practices of under-reporting are still prevalent. While all 
these practices are economically efficient within rights-based fishing, they are 
negative when viewed under EAF’s objective of ecological wellbeing. 
5. Variability, both in geographic availability and abundance of the small pelagic 
fish resource, remains one of the key problems in the sector. Whereas 
scientists largely attribute this variability to environmental conditions, 
fishers strongly believe that fishing pressure is a key factor. If correct, their 
view that re-introduction of a closed season and continued self-regulation 
through the SMCs could have a positive impact on variability. 
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6. EAF has increased the awareness and acknowledgement of competition for fish 
between fishers and marine predators, although fishers believe they should be 
given preference in terms of allocation of the resource. Bycatch limits, temporary 
area closures, island perimeter closures and MPAs, as part of EAF, force skippers 
to fish farther away from their fishing bases and factories, thereby increasing 
fishing operational costs, which is one aspect that RBM aims to reduce. 
7. Although the views and inputs of rights-holders and fishers within the 
consultative and cooperative governance structures (SWG and RMWG) are 
supposed to be advisory, the general feeling is that government responds 
positively to their opinions and interests. Thus fora exist within RBM where 
alternative views that arise as a result of EAF can be discussed and debated, 
and consensus reached.  The  key concern among some stakeholders regarding 
inclusive governance is that the OMP does not adequately include social and 
economic factors in its computation of scientific advice. In a fully functioning 
EAF operationalised by OMP, all components of the ecosystem, including human 
(social and economic) factors, need be taken into account. Inclusion of social 
and economic factors in the OMP could hopefully reduce the negative effects of 
RBM on human wellbeing. 
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